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International Law and the American Hostages in Iran
by Dr. Walter L. Williams, Jr.*
For over ten weeks at this writing, the Iranian Government has held fifty-three United
States citizens in close confinement. Fifty-one
of these Americans have privileged status as
U.S. embassy personnel.' The Iranian Government has held these Americans hostage for the
return to Iran of Mohammed Riza Shah Pahlevi, the former Iranian Head of State. 'I'he
Iranian demand upon the U.S. Government for
return of the Shah, made when he was permitted to visit the U.S. solely to secure emergency medical treatment, continues now, although the Shah has departed U.S. territory.
The seizure of these Americans and the resulting crisis in U.S.-Iranian relations have
drawn the close attention of governments and
peoples around the world. In modern times,
probably no other event has more compellingly
raised the questions of international legal re-

sponsibility for protection of aliens in their person and their civil liberties, and of the permissible sanctions of self-help available to a government to protect its nationals abroad. Those
two questions are the focus of this brief article
for the Army Lawyer.
These are important questions for military
lawyers to consider. Although the current Iranian crisis is a dramatic illustration of the pertinency of these questions, an appraisal of the
turbulent world scene suggests that in the immediate future the United States and other
countries mus expect other instances of substantial mistreatment of their nationals abroad,
including those having diplomatic status. The
military strategies that governments may employ to protect their nationals abroad obviously
will give rise to a wide range of legal problems

DA Pam 50-27-86

31
calling for the services of military lawyers.
Further, situations threatening serious personal deprivation to American citizens may
arise where U.S. military elements are on the
immediate scene and able to offer effective protection if employed immediately. The emergency
situation may not permit the luxury of awaiting
authorization to act from high governmental
levels. In that context, military commanders
will have to rely upon their lawyers for advice
as to the permissibility under international law
of military action to protect American citizens
abroad. Thus, for military lawyers, a basic understanding of international law concerning
the protection of aliens is vital. In dealing with
the situation of the American hostages in Iran,
this article discusses one of the most critical
situations that arise: foreign governmental action intentionally taken against American citizens that causes them substantial personal deprivation and threatens them with still more
extreme deprivation.
To show that the Iranian Government has
engaged in multiple major violations of international law in the case of the American hostages does not require a lengthy legal brief.
First, the confinment of the. Americans clearly
is an act chargeable to the Iranian Government.
A well-organized group of Iranian private citizens, rel?orted to be students, conducted the initial seizure of the American Embasy in Teheran
and confinement therein of American citizens.
To the present, this writer is unaware of any
conclusive evidence that, prior to the seizure,
the Ayatollah Ruhollah Mussavi Khom.eini (at
that time the actual if not formally proclaimed
Head of Government) or any other Iranian official ordered, authorized, or with foreknowledge
passively permitted the seizure. However, regardless of its involvement in the initial seizure
of the Embassy and the American citizens, the
Iranian Government failed to take any action
whatsoever to terminate the seizure. Further,
the Ayatollah Khomeini and lesser officials
quickly approved and expressly adopted as governmental action the seizure and the contintJ,~d
confinement of the American citizens, as well
as the characterization of their status as hostages for the return of the Shah to Iran. The

Iranians holding the Americans hostage have
repeatedly said that they would release the
Americans at the Ayatollah Khomeini's direction, but that direction has not been given. Thus,
under any analysis the holding of the American
hostages is an act of the Iranian Government.
The Iranian seizure and confinement of .the
Americans is a gross violation of conventional
and customary international law. In our brief
survey of the law here, we should note that,
fundamentally, we are confronted with serious
deprivations of civil liberties accorded by international law to these American citizens present
in Iran. At this point in the analysis, we are
not concerned with the special privileged status
of most of these Americans as embassy personnel. Under the U.S.-Iranian Treaty of Amity,
Economic Relations, and Consulate Rights,Z all
American citizens presents in Iran are entitled
to "receive the most constant protection and
security" within the territory of Iran. If held
"in custody," which presumes custody by properly empowered officials pursuant to regular
process and for reasonable cause, Americans
are "in every respect" to "receive reasonable
and humane treatment." On their demand their
diplomatic or consular representatives is to be
"accorded full opportunity to safeguard" their
interests. Each is to be "promptly informed of
accusations against him, allowed full facilities
reasonably necessary to his defense and given
a prompt and impartial" determination of his
case.
These foregoing rights of the American
hostages have been outrageously violated. This
pertains not only to the specific details of their
confinement, but as to the confinement itself.
From the outset of their seizure, the publicly
pronounced objective has been to hold the
Americans as hostages for the return of the
Shah to Iran, with various threats of increased
deprivation to them (criminal proceedings, prison confinement, even death) if the Shah does
not return. Additionally, emphatic threats have
been made that the hostages will be killed if
the U.S. government attempts any use of force
to release them. Under the laws of all st~tes, if
a guard were to deliberately kill a defenseless
prisoner, that would be murder.
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Further, as regards holding these Americans
as hostages, even under the law of war in situations of armed conflict, two of the most important prohibitions in the Geneva Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilians in Time of
War 3 (both Iran and the U.S. are parties) are
the express prohibitions against the holding of
civilians as hostages and of taking reprisals
against civilians. These prohibitions, resulting
from the massive cruelties against civilians in
World War II, dramatize the unlawful conduct
of the Iranian government in holding these
Americans as hostages and in subjecting them
to continuous deprivations as reprisal for the
failure of the U.S. Government to return the
Shah to Iran. Those deprivations include confinement in circumstances closely approximating solitary confinement; subjecting them to
threats of possible long-term imprisonment or
execution, and continuously exposing them to
the possibility of death or injury if the incessantly demonstrating Iranian crowds should get
out of control.
As regards the various Iranian assertions
that the hostages might or will be tried for
crimes of espionage if the Shah does not return
to Iran, the very fact that conducting the trials
turns on the return of the Shah shows that the
true objective for holding the Americans is not
for the purpose of trial for alleged crimes. Further, no formal charges have been made against
any individual nor, to this writer's knowledge,
has any specific act of criminal espionage by
any individual even been formally alleged. At
this point, the special status of virtually all of
the American captives as U.S. embassy personnel becomes relevant. Under the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations,"' to which
the U.S. and Iran are parties, these Americans,
regardless of the particular subcategory of
privileged status that applies to each individual,
all share in a minimum "floor" of protection
under that convention: the immunity from any
form of arrest or detention and from criminal
prosecution for acts performed in the course of
their duties." The appropriate remedy for the
Iranian Government, if it in good faith believed that at least some of the American captives had committed criminal espionage, would

be to demand that the U.S. government withdraw those persons from Iran." Indeed, under
the Vienna Convention, even in time of armed
conflict, the host state is obligated not only to
allow these personnel to depart at their will,
but also, to provide adequate facilities to assist
in their departure.'
These foregoing rights are also, in general,
long-standing hallowed rights under customary
international law, which have been incorporated
into these bilateral and multilateral international agreements. 8 The conduct of the Iranian
Government has rightly been condemned as a
violation of international law by the general
world community, through statements of governmental officials, and by the chief authoritative judicial and political agencies of the United
Nations Organization, the International Court
of Justice and the Security Council. All have
called for the immediate release of the Americans.
With the Iranian Government standing in violation of international law, the question is what
are the permissible sanctions that may be employed against that government to terminate
continuing deprivations against the American
citizens. First, the principal sanctioning goals
in a situation of violation of international law
of protection of aliens are (a) immediate deterrence and (b) restoration, that is, sanctions
may be employed first, to deter a government
from acting to cause impermissible deprivation
to aliens or to increase the level of such deprivation and, second, to terminate an impermissible
deprivation, where the target government's
action is one of continuing nature, e.g., unlawful confinement. The anticipated or actual deprivation may range from very minor effect to
grave injury or death. The nature and extent of
the deprivation obviously affects the nature of
the sanction that may lawfully be employed.
As regards the range of permissible sanctions
in the Iranian situation, we should first consider
the employment of sanctions by community
agencies acting for the global community under
the U.N. Charter. Undoubtedly, in either the
situation of immediate deterrence or of restoration, the Security Council acting under Chapter
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VII of the U.N. Charter could either authorize
or order the employment of non-military sanctions by any or all member states and could
authorize the employment of military sanctions
of whatever degree of coerciveness it judged
necessary to deter or to terminate the Iranian
Government's unlawful conduct against American citizens. The U.S. Government indeed requested the Security Council to order economic
sanctions against Iran, in light of the Iranian
Government's failure to obey the orders of the
Security Council and of the International Court
of Justice to release the American hostages.
However, events have highlighted the difficulties of exclusive reliance on community sanctions. These difficulties include (a) where aliens
are threatened with imminent deprivation,
securing timely deterrent community action by
the Security Council under even the optimum of
operating circumstances; (b) the Council's lack
of authority to order the national employment
of military forces, or itself to deploy a U.N.
military unit, absent prior agreement by member states to place military forces at the Council's disposal, and (c) the power of any Perrnanent Member of the Security Council to exercise a veto to prevent the Council from characterizing the propriety of the offending state's
conduct and/or deciding to authorize or order
any sanctions. The Soviet veto of the Council's
resolution ordering economic sanctions against
Iran is therefore characteristic of these systemic difficulties. In view of the U.S. Government's prominent role in the tidal wave of
world condemnation of the Soviet Union's
massive act of aggression in unlawfully invading Afghanistan, a Soviet veto was largely foregone.
What then are the permissible sanctions in
self-help to deter or to terminate unlawful
deprivations by a foreign government against
aliens? Traditional customary international law
permitted the state to which the alien owed allegiance to use all necessary forms of sanctioning strategies from harsh diplomatic notes
to the substantial application of armed force. 9
Today, under the U.N. Charter, a state dearly
may employ in self-help all sanctioning strategies short of the threat or use of armed force,

without prior authorization by the Security
Council. 1 " Thus, in the Iranian situation, the
U.S. Government already has lawfully employed
certain diplomatic and economic sanctions
against Iran and lawfully may intensify those
sanctions in the future. Also, military strategies
that do not constitute a present threat of use or
actual use of armed force against a state likewise are permissible. Examples are strategies
already employed by the U.S. Government in
the Iranian situation, such as the alerting of
military units or the movement of military units
under conditions indicating that although the
future use of miltary forice may be a possibility, no present threat of use or actual use
of force is intended.
1

The crucial question concerning use of sanctions in self-help to protect nationals abroad is
whether the threat of use or use of armed force
against the offending. state is permissible under
the U.N. Charter: the text of the Charter is the
starting point for analysis. The principal relevant clauses of the Charter are Articles 2 ( 4)
and 51. Article 2(4), the principal prohibition
on the use of force, provides that, "All members
shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of
any state, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the Purposes of the United Nations." In
turn, Article 51 states, "Nothing in the present
Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed
attack occurs against a member of the United
Nations, until the Security Council has taken
measures necessary to maintain international
peace and security.... "Further, both the letter
and the spirit of the language of the Purposes
of the U.N. Charter and of the Charter provisions in general, are that states are expected to
settle their disputes without resort to force. If
a continuing unresolved dispute situation is a
threat to international peace, the issue should
be taken before the Security Council, as the authoritative community agency empowered to
characterize the situation and to determine appropriate action.
In discussing the question of the impact of

---------------.,-----,---------,.--------------1::···
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these U.N. Charter provisions upon the use of
force in self-help to protect nationals abroad in
situli\tion~ similar to the Iranian case, we shall
consider first, the use of force for the goal of
immediate deterrence.· In the situation where
that goal is operative, the features we posit here
for discussion are that the alien is threatened
with imminent, substantial personal depriva.::
tion, yet at least a reasonable expectation exists
that if his government acts swiftly the deprivation can be prevented. Although the situation
may occasionally be one in which the alien has
not yet suffered any deprivation, our model's
factual prerequisites of notice to his government of the emergency and of his government
being able to mount a timely military action
suggest that the situation more generally will
be one in which the alien already has ··suffered
some deprivation, e.g., seizure, and at a later
date is threatened with an immjmint substantial increase in deprivation, e.g., ~er:lous bodily·
harm or death or a significant period of penal
confinement. In our posited situation, the objective is one of conservation of vital human
values in an em.ergency situation threatening
destruc:tion or substantial damage to those
values.
When the posited emergency situation arises,
does Article 2(4) bar use of force inself-help to
protect one's nationals abroad? Many authorities11 have asserted that Articles 2(4) and 51
should be ,counte~poised, with the· resu1t that
only one objective for the use of force in selfhelp would be permissible under the Charter,
the use of force in individual or collective selfdefense, until such time as the Security Council
takes effective action. Moving from that premise, some authorities have relied on the concept of self-defense to justify the use of force
to protect one's nationals abroad.'~ Others have
challenged whether situations of protection of
nationals abroad could be viewed, literally or
in policy, as a response to an "armed attack"
against the sanctioning state.'" From the latter
perspective, if the Security Council does not
act or cannot act with sufficient swiftness, and
if use of military force were necessary to prevent substantial harm to aliens, their state must
either passively permit their death or grave

damage or else be in violation of the Charter
by using force unlawfully. That view obviously
interprets the intent of the framers of the
Charter to be that regardless of the emergency
conditions, it would be preferable that any number of human lives be destroyed or damaged
rather than risk the potential abuses of forcible self-help in international relations, even in
the limited instances of emergency situations.''
One understands, then, why some authorities
have relied on the principle of self-defen~e.
First, since the principle is enshrined in Article
51, it provides a convenient .d~vicEt to opt out
of the challenge of confro~ting head-on the
question of int~rpretation of the prohibition on
the use of forcein Article 2(4) in the context
of use of force in ~elf:;h~lp to protect one's nationals, and it allows one to continue to preserve
at least an apparent verbal symmetry of these
Charter provisions. Secondly, the use of force
in protection of nationals, especially in emergency protection, is related to use of force in
self-defense; there is much t.}J~t,. is an.alogous:
Both are illustrations of self-help ·to conserve,
to protect interests. from ~ub~tantialdepriva
tions by the target state, and i~ sit~ations Uke
the Ira.n case, where Embassy premises and personnel are seized, the symbolic identifica~ion of
those persons with their state is cl.oser th!lnif,
for example, fifty American tourists 'liad . beeii
seized. When one is consiqering the use of ·forcibife self-help to dete~ s{ibsta.ntial deprivation of
11a.tip:q~l by a foreign governme~t in an emergency situation, as we are here, the temptation
to ll1erge the two is especially strong.
However, the contexts for these two forms
of se1f-help are decidedly different and confusion
of the forms by ti·eating both as self-defense
is bad thinking and bad policy. It is an argument that, "equates the protection of nationals
abroad with .the preservation of the state Itself."'" The context for the development of
policy and law as to self-defense against armed
attack pertains to response to unlawful use of
armed force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of the defending state.
"Self-defense, properly understood, is but the
most dramatic of self-help ... the test for law-
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fulness commonly applied is that the target
state ... is faced with a threat to its territorial
integrity or political independence so imminent
that it must itself immediately resort to the unilateral use of the military instrument in order
to protect itself." 16 The context of the use of
force in self-help to protect one's nationals
abroad involves various forms of unlawful action of the offending government occurring in
its own territory against groups of aliens varying in many characteristics (e.g., number, age,
sex, reasons for presence in foreign country,
nature of relationship to their own government) and having differing forms and extents
of personal deprivation (e.g., loss of freedom of
movement, psychic trauma, physical injury).
None of these features appears to bear close relation to the objective features of the conduct
of the offending state in the self-defense context, the substantial use of force in "armed attack," nor to the major interests involved in
the very continuation of the existence of the defending state, its territorial integrity and political independence. Further, the sense of crisis
level in the perspectives both of officials and of
the body politic is very high in avowed situations
of self-defense, and wide latitude is granted by
international law to the defending state in its
determination of the necessary and proportionate response of unlawful armed attack. These
factors might well result in excessive force (in
destructiveness, in duration and/or in geographic ambit) being used in self-help to protect nationals abroad, where a more restrictive
perspective on necessity and proportionality
would seem to be required. 17 Indeed, one could
argue that the news media's highlighting of the
rather casual reference to Article 51 of the
U.N. Charter by U.S. Government spokesmen
in press conferences early in the Iranian situation has served unduly to heighten the sense
of crisis and of grievance in the American public. Correspondingly, this may make it more
difficult politically for the U.S. Government at
some future date to continue to opt for non-use
of military force in the Iranian situation.
Thus, the conclusion here is that Article 51
of the U.N. Charter does not apply to forcible
self-help to protect nationals abroad. However,

this does not mean that Article 2 ( 4) of the
Charter bars forcible self..:help in the emergency
deterrence situation we are discussing. In brief,
the framers of the Charter, as rational persons,
obviously realized that emergencies might arise
in which aliens could be killed or suffer other
serious deprivation by unlawful coercion before
effective U.N. actiori could be taken. Further,
no basis in policy or practice exists to suggest
that national officials of the world community,
at the establishment of the United Nations or
today, would interpret Article 2 ( 4) to prohibit
their use of force to protect their nationals from
such unlawful coercion where forcible. selfhelp was the only hope for timely action. "Laws
are made for men and not for creatures of the
imagination." 18 To interpret Article 2 ( 4) to
require a "forced sacrifice" of human values,
indeed of human lives, on the altar of absolutism in applying the general principle prohibit.,.
ing forcible self-help would not only invite the
contemptuous repudiation of governments. That
interpretation would deny the ultimate goal to
which Article 2( 4) and the entirety of the Charter are committed : the promotion of fundamental human dignity throughout the world
community. Even in the early years of the
United Nations organization, so fervent a supporter of the Charter limitations on unilateral
use of force as ProfessorPhilip C. Jessup, distinguished professor of international law and
later a member· of the International Court of
Justice, recognized the exceptional situation of
forcible self-help in the emergency deterrence
situation. "It would .seem that the only possible argument against the, substitution of collective measures under the Security Council
for individual measures by a member state
would be the inability of the international organization to act with the speed requisite to preserve life." 19 Thus, properly interpreted, Article 2(4), like any proscription of law, is subject
to limitations in applica1;ion by exceptionaJ situations, here the need for forcible helf~heip to
protect nationals in an emergency deterrence
situation. As regards the Iranian situation, if
the crisis were. to escalate, for exainple, by
the threat of imminent death or injury to the

-
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American hostages, and a reasonable appraisal
of the circumstances indicated that immediate
forcible self-help without the delay of securing
Security Council authorization or other community action was the only means of preventing
this new and more serious deprivation to American citizens, forcible self-help would be permissible under the Charter. Of course, the U.S.
Government would be obligated to give immediate notice to the Council and would be subject
to Council appraisal of the decision to use
force and the manner in which force was used
in the situation.
We have been discussing the permissibility,
under the Charter, of forcible self-help to protect nationals in an emergency deterrence situation. What of the situation where a foreign
government already is subjecting aliens to unlawful, continuing coercion that is not so injurious as manifestly to threaten imminent
death or serious injury, yet is a very substantial
deprivation of their rights in the protection of
their person and of their civil liberties? Undoubtedly, this describes the situation of the
American hostages in Iran, as of this writing.
In that situation, the sanctioning goal of the
U.S. Government is not that of emergency deterrence, but of restoration, the termination of
the continuing, unlawful confinement of the
American hostages and of the deprivational consequences and risks associated with that confinement under the current circumstances in
Iran. The question is whether forcible self-help
by the U.S. Government in this restoration sitl1ation would be permissible under the U.N. Charter. Obviously, if the Security Council authorizes the United States to act, forcible self-help
in accord with whatever conditions were set by
the Council would be permissible. (Here, action by the United States would be both in
self-help and to vindicate Security Council authority under the Charter.) Correspondingly, if
the Council, exercising its Charter authority to
which the U.S. Government is subject, refused
to authorize forcible self-help by the United
States, then U.S. use of force would be impermissible. The Council would have authoritatively characterized the current Iran situation

as one not presently justifying the use of armed
force.
However, what if the Council was prevented
from functioning to authorize forcible self-help
by the United States, due to the exercise of th.e
veto power by one of the Permanent Members?
We have already noted the Soviet veto of the
U.S. request for Security Council economic
sanctions against Iran. Just as likely is the
probability of a Soviet veto of any proposal that
the Council authorize forcible self-help. Our
conclusion is that whenever the Council, rather
than acting by majority vote t9 disapprove the
use of forcible self-help, is prevented by the
veto power from acting to express existing majority support for authorizing forcible selfhelp, unilateral decision to use force in self-help
is permissible under the Charter. "A rational
and contemporary interpretation of the Charter must conclude that Article 2( 4) suppresses
self-help insofar as the organization assumes
the role of enforcement. When it cannot, selfhelp prerogatives revive." 20 Much of the preceding discussion concerning the permissibility
of forcible self-help in im emergency deterrence
situation when timely community action is impossible under optimum operation conditions
applies with even greater vigor to the problem
of the failure of the Council to be able to function due to the exercise of the yeto power. 21 That
this is the proper interpretation of the limitation on use of force under Article 2 ( 4) is supported both by interpretation in accord with the
principle of effectiveness in implementing the
principal purposes of the U.N. Charter and with
the principal of subsequent conduct of the
parties to the Charter for nearly thirty-five
years. 22 To interpret . the Charter otherwise
would be "an invitation to lawbreakers who
would anticipate a paralysis in the Security
Council's decision dynamics." 23 Indeed, with
the inability of the Council to act, to hold that
a state "can, with impunity, attack the nationals ... of other states without any fear of
response ... is simply to honor lawlessness." 2 ~
We have concluded that forcible self-help to
protect nationals from substantial unlawful deprivation by foreign government is permissible

,--
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under the U.N. Charter in emergency deterrence situations and, if. the Security Council is
prevented by veto from functioning to authorize forcible self-help, in restoration situations.
This conclusion does not suggest that, if not
barred by the Charter, forcible self-help is without limits. Under contemporary conventional
and customary international law, all uses of
armed force, in any context, are subject to the
requirements of necessity and proportionality.
As regards the question of forcible self-help by
the United States at some point'in the Iranian
situation, factors to be considered in the situation existing at that time would include: (a)
the present extent of deprivation in terms of
such criteria as the type of deprivation and the
number, sex, age and health of the nationals;
(b) the imminency of further deprivations and
their anticipated extent under the same criteria;
(c) the outcome of prior attempts to secure
lawful conduct of the offending government
and the anticipated outcome of any further attempts to protect one's nationals without use of
force; (d) the degree of expectation that forcible self-help would achieve the goal of protec~
tion, involving such criteria as the anticipated
extent of resistance by the offending government to the military operation; the extent of
violence that· the offending government or its
citizens might exercise against the foreign nationals because of the exercise of forcible selfhelp, and the extent of the risk of death or
injury to one's nationals by the self-help operation itself; (e) the destructiveness of the weaponry to be employed, and the planned duration
and geographic ambit of the military operation,
and (f) the extent of the risks of death or injury to noncombatant citizens of the offending
state or of third states. If a good faith, knowledgeable appraisal of the then-existing Iranian
situation under this framework of analysis provided an affirmative response to the requirements of necessity and proportionality, United
States use of forcible self-help would be permissible. If not, then regardless of the threshhold question of U.N. Charter limits on forcible
self-help, forcible self-help in the particular instance would be impermissible under interna- .
tionallaw.

FOOTNOTES
'''Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law,
College of William and Mary, B.A., M.A., LL.B., University of Southern California; LL.M., J.S.D., Yale
University.
1

Fifty Americans are confined in the U.S. embassy
building in Teheran, and three in the premises of the
Iranian Foreign Ministry. Two of the Americans at
the embassy are private citizens.

• Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular
Rights Between the United States of America and
Iran, 8 U.S.T. 899. All quoted provisions of the Treaty
are from Article II.
"Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949.
T.I.A.S. 3365. Article 34 prohibits taking civilians as
hostages and Article 33 prohibits reprisals. ·
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. 500
U.N.T.S. 95; 23 U.S.T. 3227; T.I.A.S. 3227.
5
Articles 29, 31 and 37.
"Article 9.
7
Article 44.
4

• As regards the customary international law on the
protection of aliens, see concise discussion and authorities cited in Lillich, "Forcible Self-Help by States
to Protect Human Rights," 53 Iowa L.R. 325, 326 et
seq. (1967); Mirvahabi, "Entebbe: Validity of Claims
in International Law," XVII-4 The Military Law and
Law of War Review 627, 648 (1978).
• See authorities cited supra, note 8. See, also, Lillich,
"Humanitarian Intervention: A Reply to Ian Brownlie and a Plea for Constructive Alternatives," in
Moore ( ed.), Law and Civil War in the Modern
World 229 ( 197 4), citing various authorities.
10
Thomas & Thomas, Non-Intervention 312 (1956);
Lillich, supra, note 8. Both in drafting and in practice for nearly thirty-five years under the Charter,
the state parties have. restricted the. Charter limitation on sanctions in self-help to. those involving threat
or use of armed force.
" See discussion in Lillich, supra, note 8, at 334, 337;
Mirvahabi, supra, note 8, at 645; Wright, "The 'Legality of Intervention Under the United Nations· Charter," 51 Am. Soc'y Jnt'l L. Proceedings 79, 88 (1957).
"Apart from self-defense and colleCtive self"defense,
self-help by states is now illegal." Brownlie, ''Humanitarian Intervention," in Moore (ed.), s;_pra, note
9, 217.
12

E.g., Bowett, Self-Defence in International" Law· 92
(1958); Waldock, "The Regulation of the Use of
Force by Individual States in International Law," 81
Recueil des Cours 455 (II-1952) ; Fenwick, "The
Dominican Republic: Intervention or Collective SelfDefense," 60 Am. J. Int'l L. 64 (1966) ; Mirvahabi,
supra, note 8, at 632,.-637.
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See discussion in . Lillich, supra, note 8, at 337;
Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by
States 299-3'o1 (1963).
,. "It is true that the protection of nationals presents
particular diffic'ulties and that a government faced
with a deliberate massacre of a considerable number
of nationals in a foreign state would have cogent reasons of humanity for acting, and would also be under
very great political pressure. The possible risks of
denying the legality of action in a case of such urgency, an exceptional circumstance, must be weighed
against the more calculable dangers of providing
legal pretexts for the commission of breaches of the
peace in the pursuit of national rather than humanitarian interests." Brownlie, supra, note 13 at 301.

manitarian. intervention phraseology, however, evokes
more readily natio-na(security fears that occasionally
may lead to more extensive uses of force." Lillich,
supra, note 8, at n. 77,-337-338.

13

'" Lill_ich, s'!tpra, note 8, at 336.
"McDougal, "Authority to Use Force on the High
Seas," XX Naval War College Review 19, 29 (Dec.
1967). Mirvahabi, supra, note 8, at 632-637, applies
the concept of self-defense extensively in analyzing
the permissibility of the Israeli use of forcible selfhelp in the Entebbe situation, with no apparent recognition of the differing contexts of use of force in
self-defense and in protection of nationals abroad, yet
gives only cur!;ory mention to the application of selfhelp to protect nationals as a· sanctioning strategy
under the international law of protection of aliens, at
648.
7
' "The use of self-defense terminology instead of hu-

18

Westlake, International Law 306 ( 1902).

'"Jessup, A Modern Law of Nations 170 (1949).
20

Reis:r:nan, Nullity and Revision 850 ( 1971). See also,
Lillich, supra, note 9; N anda, "The United States'
Action in the 1965 Dominican Crisis: Impact on
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